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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
More than 1200 banks have lost banking license since first commercial banks appeared in 
Russia in late 1980-ies (that is about half of all ever registered banks). August 1998 was 
disastrous for Russian banking sector. The banks still did not recover from the consequences 
of the crisis: value of assets of the banking industry as well as total bank capital in the country 
is still by far less than prior August 1998. Such crisis is not peculiar for Russia. Banking 
crises appeared here and there in developing as well as developed countries; they often are 
considered as an inevitable consequence of financial liberalization.  
 
Although systemic banking crises are usually triggered by a macroeconomic shock, 
effectively they reveal problems accumulated by the banking industry. Therefore the roots of 
banking crises should be found at a micro-level. The ultimate cause of a bank's failure is 
usually bad asset decisions, resulting in bad loans and other losses. In our view, problems of 
many Russian banks were caused by excessive risk-taking of the banks themselves and not by 
devaluation or default on the government debt. Poor environment the banks were operating in, 
including regulator being interested in the outcome of risky project, created incentives for 
risky behavior. The main factors explaining excessive risk-taking of Russian banks are bad 
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supervision, non-transparent financial reporting, high discount factor for future cash flows, 
and lack of safe investment opportunities. 
 
We develop a game of incomplete information of two players - a bank and a regulator - that 
reflects key features of banking in transition: weak supervision and existence of a scope for 
manipulating accounting figures. Subgame perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game 
outlines optimal behavior of banks and a regulator in transition. Predictions of the theoretical 
model bring us to the set of testable hypothesis, which are tested on the extensive data set 
including quarterly data for a vast majority of Russian banks for 1998-1999.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section is devoted to literature review. In the third 
section we develop theoretical model: starting from a case of one-period game we then we 
proceed to infinitely repeating game. The forth section deals with the empirical testing of the 
hypothesis rendered by the theoretical model. The fifth section concludes.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Phenomena of bank failures received due attention from researches and policymakers and 
causes of banking crises were extensively studied. The bulk of literature can be broadly 
divided into those finding macro-level reasons to be the main determinants of bank failures 
and those that attribute the main role to microeconomic ones. Paradoxically at the first glance, 
financial stabilization was often named as one of the causes of banking crises (Demirguc-
Kunt, Detragache, 1997, 1999). Looking closely, however, one would see that the primary 
item of banks' profits in financially unstable environment was inflation-based revenues and by 
no means traditional banking. In the course of financial stabilization banks were deprived of 
such revenues and their financial state started to deteriorate. Further macroeconomic shock in 
the form of devaluation or default leads to forex losses, sharp rise in unpaid loans and 
consequent crash of banking system. Thus, often banking crisis is viewed as a twin of a 
currency crisis (Kaminsky, 1998). However, some authors argue that macroeconomic shocks 
taken alone cannot be blamed for the banking crises as they only reveal the problems 
accumulated by the banking industry. In this respect micro-based factors are of the same or 
even greater importance as macro ones in explaining bank's failure and excessive risk taking.  
 
A common feature of banking industries in transition is large number of banks compared to 
developed countries. Sometimes it is argued that such overpopulation undermines stability of 
banking system. Schnitzer (1998) suggested a model showing that the accumulation of bad 
loans is more likely the greater the number of banks is.  
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In most countries capital requirements are used to limit speculative activities of the banks. A 
bank that chooses more risky strategy should have larger capital. This makes banks 
owners/managers more careful and therefore helps to defend bank's creditors. Much research 
on bank risks considers relations between bank's risk taking and its capital. The problem can 
be studied in static (Furlong and Keeley, 1989) or dynamic (Milne and Whalley, 1998) 
environment, on micro- or macro- level (Gorton, Winton, 1995). A detailed survey of recent 
studies is provided in Freixas and Rochet (1998). 
 
Prudential regulation is another issue extensively studied in the literature. Efficiency of the 
regulation determines the possibility of banks to expose themselves to excessive risks. As it is 
shown in Mailath and Mester (1994) position of a regulator seriously affects behavior of a 
bank. Interestingly, in the latter paper bank's choice between risky and safe strategies is 
analyzed without any initial capital requirements. This goes in line with recent discussion 
whether capital requirements taken alone can be sufficient to regulate banks' riskiness. The 
question is vital for countries in transition with typically weak prudential supervision (see 
Hellmann, Murdock, Stiglitz (1999) or Caprio and Honohan (1998)). A survey of studies on 
the issues of prudential supervision and banking regulation is presented in Bhattacharya, Boot 
and Thakor (1998) or Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
 
Banks as creditors can substantially influence the restructuring process. Therefore behavior of 
banks in transition environment received due attention. A situation when a bank provides 
inefficient loan was suggested in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). They showed that a loan to 
inefficient borrower is a rational choice for a bank if this borrower already has a debt to this 
bank (related to sunk cost theory). Berglof and Roland (1995), (1997) developed this issue 
further. They modeled phenomena of soft budget constraint, when refunding of old borrower 
is efficient ex-post and inefficient ex-ante. An alternative explanation was suggested by 
Mitchell (1997), Mitchell (1998), where the soft budget constraint arises due to inefficient 
supervision and creditor passivity when banks have no incentives to show real amount of their 
bad debts (ex-ante and ex-post inefficiency). The survey of related models can be found in 
Mitchell (1999), Berglof and Roland (1998), Roland (1999). 
 
A key idea for understanding some processes that had place in Russian banks over the crisis 
can be found in Akerlof and Romer (1993). Managers in Akerlof and Romer's framework do 
not gamble for resurrection. Their rationale to take more risks is not the hope to save their 
bank in the case of success, but instead the owners can simply take assets away from the firm, 
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and thus pre-determine its inevitable bankruptcy. This model might be seen as a special case 
of above mentioned models of loan granting in transition as in Berglof and Roland (1998) or 
of general model of bank's behavior as in Mailath and Mester (1994). Here stolen assets could 
be considered as a private benefit of the manager and the probability of repayment as zero. In 
our view model of Akerlof and Romer is very relevant to transition economies, where 
financial intermediaries operate in the lax environment.    
 
There are few works on the determinants of Russian banking crises. Perotti and Scard (1999) 
and Perotti (2000) state that the main reason of the Russian crisis of 1998 was imprudent 
bank's behavior in poor economic environment (poor creditor rights protection, poor law 
enforcement, and absence of real prudential regulation). The history of Russian banking 
system is presented in Матовников (1998). The causes of the banking crises are studied in 
Энтов (1999), Центр Развития (1999a, 1999b) and other publications. In most of these 
papers the research is concentrated on the aggregate indicators, and a banking system is 
viewed on the macro-level. At the same time a detailed microanalysis is practically absent. In 
this paper we look at the incentives of individual banks and banks behavior.  
 
Mailath and Mester (1991) studied the interaction between bank and a regulator in the game 
theory framework. Bank’s current choice of assets affects the regulator’s policy regarding 
closure and bank understands it. Thus, the regulator’s policy in turn affects risk-taking of a 
bank. Studying subgame perfect equilibrium, Mailath and Mester came to a striking result that 
a credible regulator’s policy upon closure couldn’t be based on a simple cut-off rule on bank 
asset value. Depending on the set of parameters all 4 types of regulator strategies can be 
credible: forbearance, pre-emptive, incentive, and closure. Thus, the primary interest of 
Mailath and Mester (1991) model are the incentives of a regulator to close depository 
institution.  
 
In Mailath and Mester (1991) behavior of a bank in the second period depends on the choice 
of nature regarding the profitability of risky asset in the first period. This result seems to be 
very important because it is consistent with our vision of the actual development of the 
process of problem accumulation in Russian banks expressed in the introduction. Therefore 
the incentives of bank’s risk-taking demand more detailed investigation than in Mailath and 
Mester model.  
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3 THE MODEL  
The model presented below can be considered an extension of framework of Mailath and 
Mester (1991). We develop a game between a regulator and a bank with an element of 
uncertainty when the nature determines the outcome of a risky project. Therefore as Mailath 
and Mester suggested, bank behavior affects the strategy of a regulator, while the regulator's 
actions (or awareness about his strategy) in turn can influence bank's choice of moves.  
 
However, the assumption of perfect information present in Mailath and Mester (1991) seems 
to be not plausible for the transition environment. We think that it is hardly the case in 
developed countries and definitely contradicts the characteristics of Russian environment. We 
view inefficient monitoring (possibly accompanied by corruption) as one of the conditions for 
creating moral hazard in banks resulting in excessive risk-taking. Therefore extent the model 
allowing for incomplete information. This would make regulator’s claim to close a bank even 
less credible as we suppose was indeed the case in Russia.  
 
3.1 Model assumptions  
 
There are two players in the model: a bank and a regulator. At the beginning of the period the 
bank collects one unit of deposits and makes its investment decision. There are two 
investment opportunities available for a bank – safe and risky – which differ by rate of return 
and probability of being repaid. Safe asset has a gross return of RS =(1+rs) at the end of the 
period; risky asset brings the gross return of RR=(1+rr ) with probability p and 0 otherwise. 
The interest rate on deposits is normalized to zero and deposits are due at the end of the 
period.  
 
The return and the probability of success are subject to the following constraints:  
pRR-1<RS-1          (1.1) 
p(RR-1)= prr >rs = RS-1         (1.2) 
This set of conditions is referred to in the literature as a moral hazard problem for a financial 
intermediary with limited liability (John et al, 1991). The first inequality signals that society 
prefers safe asset to a risky one as the expected return is greater than that for safe project. 
Looking at the second inequality one may see that a bank prefers risky investment opportunity 
due to a limited liability (note that it implies that RR>RS).  
 
Regulator is the second mover. The objective of the regulator is to create incentives for bank 
to select safe project. Bank closure is the major instrument of bank regulation and often the 
only one. A credible threat of closure would preclude bank from investing into risky project. 
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The problem, however, is that the bank's choice is not observable to the. Instead, the regulator 
receives the information about the bank's choice, which contains some noise. Namely the 
regulator observes a variable φ=µ+ε, where µ={1,0}: 1 for safe, 0 for risky, and ε is a random 
variable with zero mean with known probability density function f(x). The regulator does not 
have any view on the likelihood of risky or safe behavior of the bank ex ante. 
 
After receiving the information about the bank's choice, a regulator decides whether to close 
the bank (preventive closure) or to leave it open. If the bank is closed by the regulator, the 
project is terminated at an early stage and depositors are paid back. If the bank chooses risky 
project and yet remains open, it becomes insolvent by the end of the period in the case risky 
investment fails to bring positive return. Then the bank will be liquidated under so-called 
forced closure procedure.  
 
The cost of preventive closure for the regulator per one unit of deposits Cp is exceeds the cost 
of forced closure of insolvent bank Cf , i.e. Cp ≤ Cf. For example, if the regulator bear the 
costs of paying back the depositors in case of a bank's failure Cf=Cp+1. The cost of closure 
for a bank is denoted by L, representing the value of banking license, which the bank will 
loose in the case of closure.  
 
Figure. 3.1. The game tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matrix of expected payoffs for the game is given below: 
Bank/Regulator Open (O) Closure (C) 
Risky (R)  prr - (1-p)L; - (1-p)·Cf,  -L;-Cp 
O C O C 
S R 
BANK 
REGULATOR REGULATOR 
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Safe (S)  rs;0 - L; -Cp  
 
The closure strategy of the regulator will be strictly dominated if:  
pC
C
p
f
−
≤
1
1            (1.3)  
If this is true the regulator will not close the risky bank, so this refers to forbearance, when 
bank remains open irrespective of its asset choice. For the following analysis we assume that 
it is optimal for the regulator to close the risky bank, that is: 
Cp < (1-p)·Cf            (1.4) 
 
3.2 Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium  
 
The solution to the above dynamic game of incomplete information is a perfect Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium. The probability that the regulator receives message φ if bank select a risky 
project is equal to: 
p(φ|R) = p(ε =φ)=f(φ)          (2.1) 
The probability that the regulator receives message φ if bank select a safe project is equal to: 
p(φ|S) = p(ε =φ-1)=f(φ-1)         (2.2) 
 
After receiving the message φ the regulator can assess conditional probability that the bank 
has selected a risky project (initial probabilities of safe and risky choice are assumed to be ½ 
and ½): 
)|()|(
)|()(
SpRp
RpRp
ϕϕ
ϕϕ
+
=         (2.3) 
The regulator chooses to close the bank if cost of preventive closure is less than expected cost 
of the forced closure given conditional probability of the risky choice (C fO):   
Cp < p(R|φ) (1-p)·Cf + p(S|φ) 0 = p(R|φ) (1-p)·Cf      (2.4) 
As p(R|φ) is not increasing in φ, this allows us to find a threshold level of ϕ :  
ϕ : p(R|ϕ ) =Cp /(1-p)Cf         (2.5) 
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If the regulator receives a message below ϕ  it will close the bank. The probability that a 
regulator will receive a message below the threshold level if a bank makes a risky decision is:  
∫
∞−
=≤=
ϕ
ϕε dxxfpq )()(          (2.6) 
The probability that a regulator will receive a message below the threshold level if a bank 
makes a safe decision is: 
∫
−
∞−
=−≤=
1
)()1(
ϕ
ϕε dxxfpq          (2.7) 
Values q  and q  show the probabilities of preventive closure of the bank if it chooses risky or 
safe project respectively. It is obvious that q  ≥ q , so the safe behavior decreases the 
probability of being closed. 
 
Expected payoff for a bank when risky project is chosen equals to: 
])1()[1()( LpprqLqRiskyEP r −−−+−=        (2.8) 
Expected payoff for a bank when safe project is chosen equals to: 
srqLqSafeEP )1()( −+−=          (2.9) 
Bank chooses risky project if its expected payoff from it is greater than for safe project:  
R f  S: sr rqLqLpprqLq )1(])1()[1( −+−≥−−−+−      (2.10) 
that is  
qpqp
rqprq
pqqq
rqprq
LL srsr
+−−
−−−
=
−−+−
−−−
=≤
1
)1()1(
)1)(1(
)1()1(
      (2.11) 
 
Bank will choose risky project if its losses in the case of closure are low. This result might 
explain the excessive risk-taking behavior of banks in transition, when the owners and 
managers of the bank do not incur sizable losses in case of a bank's failure and thus the value 
of the banking license is low.  
 
3.3 The Case of Normal Noise Distribution  
 
Suppose that ε is a normal random variable, which seems a natural assumption speaking about 
exogenous noise in the information received by a regulator.  The probabilities that the 
regulator receives a message φ if bank is risky (safe) are: 
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Conditional probabilities that the bank has selected risky (safe) project are respectively:  
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The regulator prefers preventive closure if  
ffp Cp
e
SpCpRpC )1(
1
10)()1)((
22
12 −
+
=⋅+−<
−
σ
ϕϕϕ      (3.5) 
A threshold level of ϕ  (a bank will be closed if φ ≤ϕ ) is equal to: 
B
C
CpC
p
pf log
2
1]
)1(
log[
2
1€ 22 σσϕ +=−−+=       (3.6) 
 
where   
p
pf
C
CpC
B
−−
=
)1(
>0 if there is no forbearance.  
 
Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability of closure if risky project is chosen q  is equal to: 
ϕ
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ϕ
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−
∞−
∫=≤=         (3.7) 
The probability of closure if safe project is chosen q  is equal to: 
Risky Safe
1 0 
RISKY SAFE 
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Bank chooses risky project if its expected payoff from it is greater than for safe project that is: 
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As in the previous sections the bank prefers a risky project to the safe one if does not value its 
license highly.  
 
3.4 Regulator Interested in the Risky Project  
 
A further extension to the model is the assumption that the regulator might be interested in the 
risky project. One of the examples of such a case is the situation that had place in Russia in 
1995-1998. The CBR was responsible not only for banking supervision but for development 
of the GKO market as well. The latter served as a major source of funds for the government, 
and the regulator stimulated banks to invest into government domestic debts.  
 
We assume that the regulator’s payoff function includes its benefit (G) in case the bank 
implements a risky project (that is a bank chooses risky project and stays open). The matrix of 
the expected payoffs for the game is given below: 
Bank/Regulator Open (O) Closure (C) 
Risky (R)  prr - (1-p)L; -(1-p)·Cf+G,  -L;-Cp 
Safe (S)  rs;0 - L; -Cp  
 
As was shown in section 3.2, the regulator chooses to close the bank if cost of preventive 
closure is smaller than expected cost of forced closure given conditional probability of the 
risky choice (C fO):   
-Cp > p(R|φ) [-(1-p)·Cf +G]+ p(S|φ) 0      (4.1) 
Note that if risky project brings private benefit G to the regulator high enough it will cause 
forbearance. In this case the above inequality will never hold. The game then becomes an 
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optimization problem of one player - the bank, and its results are trivial. Therefore for the 
further analysis we assume G<(1-p)·Cf . 
A threshold level of ϕ G variable observed by the regulator is equal to:  
ϕ G: p(R|ϕ G) =Cp /[(1-p)Cf –G]       (4.2) 
As before, having received message below ϕ G it chooses to close the bank. Not surprisingly, 
ϕ G<ϕ  (see 2.5), that means that if the regulator is interested in the risky project it is ready to 
tolerate risky behavior of banks. 
The probability that a regulator will receive a message below the threshold level if a bank 
makes a risky decision is:  
∫
∞−
=≤=
G
dxxfpq GG
ϕ
ϕε )()( /         (4.3) 
The probability that a regulator will receive a message below the threshold level (and 
consequently close the bank) if a bank makes a safe decision is: 
∫
−
∞−
=−≤=
1
)()1(
G
dxxfpq GG
ϕ
ϕε         (4.4) 
The bank will choose risky project if it does not value its banking license high enough: 
)1)(1(
)1()1(
pqqq
rqprq
LL
GGG
sGrG
G
−−+−
−−−
=≤        (4.5) 
Distortion created by the regulator interest in the risky project is 0≥−=∆ LLG . The value of 
the banking license that would prevent banks from excessive risk-taking is higher in the case 
the regulator has its private interest in risky project.  
 
Figure 3.3.  
Marina Malyutina, Svetlana Parilova, 2001  
 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
1 1.9 2.8 3.7 4.6 5.5 6.4 7.3
variance
va
lu
e 
of
 li
ce
ns
e
SAFE AREA
RISKY AREA
interested regulator
not-interested regulator
 
3.5 Infinite Game  
 
As it is shown above, value of banking license is an important parameter, which determines 
the behavior of a bank. In one-period game a value of banking license is an exogenous 
parameter. We can endogenize this parameter in a game with infinite number of periods, as 
the value of a license for a bank is simply a discounted value of its future profits. Let β to be a 
discount coefficient, 0<β<1. 
 
We assume that the game at each period starts with the bank choice between risky and safe 
project. The regulator is not sure about the bank’s choice, just as in one-period game, instead 
it receives the information about bank’s behavior, which contains noise, i.e. in period t it 
observes parameter φt. The regulator then decides whether to close the bank or to keep it 
open. If the bank is closed the game ends.  
 
If the bank chooses a safe project and it is not closed by the regulator, it receives proceeds 
from its safe investment, pays back depositors and continues its operations in the next period. 
If the bank selects a risky project and it is not closed by the regulator (no preventive closure), 
then the future of the bank depends on the realization of its investment. If the bank is 
successful and its risky project brings positive return, the bank’s depositors are paid back and 
the bank continues to operate in the next period. However, if the risky project fails the bank 
becomes insolvent and it is closed under forced closure procedure and the game ends. The 
payoffs from the safe/risky projects and costs of preventive and forced closure as well as 
expected payoff functions are the same as described in section 3.1.  
 
Marina Malyutina, Svetlana Parilova, 2001  
 13
Figure 3.4. 
 
Bank chooses between {Risky; Safe} 
 
Regulator does not observe the choice of the bank  
instead it gets message φt containing noise. Regulator 
chooses between {Open; Close}. If he chooses 'Close'  
the game ends. 
 
If the bank chose risky project and remained open, 
nature decides whether the project was successful. 
If not the bank is closed under the forced closure procedure. 
In case the project was successful bank enters the t+1 period. 
 
Bank chooses between {Risky; Safe} 
 
Regulator receives φt+1 and chooses between {Open; Close} 
 
Nature determines the success of risky project if undertaken, etc. 
 
An important feature of the model is that the regulator is uncertain about the choice of the 
bank even at the end of the period, unless the bank had selected risky project that failed. 
Moreover, if the regulator keeps the track of previous bank’s behavior as suggested in 
Rubinstein-Yaari (1983) the threat to use that information would not be credible unless both 
agents are extremely patient. We will discuss the possibilities of usage past information 
below. According to the model assumptions, if the bank survives at the end of the period it is 
solvent by the beginning of the next period, as otherwise it would have been closed under 
forced closure procedure. Given that, the regulator’s choice whether to close the bank or to 
leave it open in period t is entirely based on the information received in the period t, that is φt.  
The condition when the regulator prefers preventive closure is given by inequality (2.4). The 
threshold level ϕ  is determined as in (2.5), and the probabilities of preventive closure by the 
regulator observing information φ if the bank makes safe/risky investment ( q  and q ) are 
calculated as in (2.6) and (2.7).   
 
The bank however looks forward in the next periods as the choice of the risky project and 
higher probability of preventive closure may deprive bank of the future profits. Let us denote 
the discounted utilities of safe and risky choice for the bank as Us and Ur. If a bank is not 
Period t  
Period t+1  
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closed in period t, it will face exactly the same choice between Risky and Safe strategy in the 
period (t+1). This logic allows us to estimate the discounted utility of the risky and safe 
choices under the assumption that these strategies are optimal:  
rr rpq
pqU
)1(1
)1(
−−
−
= β         (5.1) 
ss rq
q
U
)1(1
)1(
−−
−
= β          (5.2) 
 
The necessary condition for the safe project to be chosen is a sufficiently high discount factor  
or low discount rate (Us >Ur):  
)()1)(1(
)1()1(
srrrpqq
rqprq sr
−−−
−−−
=≥ ββ        (5.3) 
 
The above condition implies that if a bank has sufficiently high discount factor (β exceeds a 
threshold level β ), then bank attaches importance to future income flows. The optimal choice 
for a bank is therefore safe project, as it gives the bank more chances to stay open and receive 
future cash inflows. If a bank is short-term oriented with a low discount factor, it will choose 
risky project, which allows the bank to get high profits today at the risk of being closed. The 
threat of closure does not prevent the bank from risky behavior, as future profits are not 
important for the bank.  
 
The major problem identified in the game described above is myopia of the regulator, which 
decides upon closing the banks based entirely on information received in the current period. 
Rubinstein-Yaari (1983) introduced the idea that if interaction between players is repeated 
indefinitely, the principal (the regulator) observes a large number of outcomes. In principle 
this might allow the regulator to make its choice with a greater precision and to punish the 
bank if it does not choose safe strategy more accurately, thus ensuring the credibility of 
closure threat. As long as the number of periods increases the law of large numbers can be 
applied. A challenging problem which arises in that kind of infinite principal-agent problems 
is how to choose threshold message which signals that the agent deviated from the strategy 
prescribed by the principal. Salanie (1997) suggested that the appropriate tool for this problem 
is the law of iterated logarithm, which bounds the large deviations from the law of large 
numbers. Following Salanie (1997) let a be any real number greater than 1, and  
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         (5.4) 
 
The law of the iterated logarithm states that  
1)1suplimPr( =<
∞→
tt
δ           (5.5) 
The appropriate policy for the regulator would be therefore to choose a > 1 and close the 
bank at period t if:  
t
ta
t
t
i
i
lnln211
2
1
σϕ >−∑
=
         (5.6) 
Note that if the bank does choose safe strategy in each period then the probability of 
preventive closure will be vanishing. This allows us to solve the problem of a regulator not 
being able to not distinguish between risky and safe banks, which inevitable rises in one 
period game with increasing noise.  
 
Thus we came to a crucial conclusion that long-living regulator can enforce long-run program 
of banking regulation and therefore the threat of punishment of risky banks would be credible. 
This implies that independent regulator is more efficient in supervising banks. This idea is 
especially important for transition economies because of intransparency and poor quality of 
information received by the regulator.  
 
3.6 Model predictions  
The resulting equilibrium in the game, i.e. the optimal choices of a bank and a regulator, 
depends on the set of exogenous parameters: rate of return on safe and risky project, the 
probability of positive return on risky project and costs of preventive and forced closure. The 
main predictions that follow directly from solution of the finite horizon model are as follows: 
 
1. The regulator chooses forbearance strategy when the cost of preventive closure is high 
enough in comparison with the cost of forced closure. In this case a threat of closure is not 
credible and it does not affect the bank's choice.  
 
2. The bank chooses safe project if it values its banking license highly. The result holds even 
when bank is operating in forbearance environment.  
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3. The bank chooses risky project if the probability of success on the risky project is high 
enough and the value of banking license is low. The result holds even if the bank does not 
expect forbearance from the regulator. 
 
It is interesting also to analyze what is the impact of an increase in uncertainty on the 
threshold level of the value of banking license, preventing bank from risky behavior.  
4. Accounting intransparency creates incentives for excessive risk-taking by banks. Namely 
the less transparent a bank is for the regulator, the more the bank should value its license 
to choose safe project. 
The above prediction follows from the Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1.  
0≥
∂
∂
σ
L  if ε is a uniform, exponential or normal random variable.  
Proof of proposition 1:  
For the uniform and exponential distribution the proof is obvious. For the normal distribution 
see Appendix 1.  
 
Introducing private benefit of the regulator in a risky project leads to the fifth prediction of the 
model: 
5. Regulator privately interested in risky project is more likely to choose forbearance 
strategy thus stimulating excessive risk-taking by banks 
 
Extending the model to infinite horizon provides us with one more important prediction: 
6. Independent regulator is more efficient in supervising banks than shortsighted and 
dependent regulator, which can not enforce long-run program of banking regulation. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The model presented above explains development of the Russian banking sector and 
environment the bank operated in reasonably well. In our view, problems of Russian banks 
were caused mainly by their imprudent behavior rather than some macro-shocks. Based on the 
model predictions we develop testable hypotheses. We then test these hypotheses on the 
extensive data set, which includes banks' balances and profit&loss accounts presented to the 
regulator (CBR) on the quarterly basis for the period 1997-1999 as well as data on 
employment, and the fact of license withdrawal. The database includes all banks that provided 
their statements to the Central bank that is about 1400 -1500 banks per one date. The data are 
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cleaned to meet requirements for consistency such as the sum of assets is equal to the sum of 
liabilities and equity, etc.  (see Appendix for details on construction of the data set.) 
 
4.1 Regulatory forbearance 
 
4.1.1 Violation of prudential requirements 
The first prediction of the model states that the regulator chooses forbearance strategy 
whenever cost of preventive closure of a bank is considerably higher than the so-called cost of 
forced closure, meaning the cost of closing a bank when it is already insolvent. Intransparent 
accounting rules create a scope for manipulation the accounting figures so that the regulator 
cannot distinguish between good and bad banks. Therefore the regulator will be reluctant to 
undertake a preventive closure due to a possibility to close a viable bank and thus loose a 
financial intermediary institution. In other words intransparency of accounting reporting 
increases the cost of preventive closure that may result in forbearance from the regulator side.  
 
As noted by many practitioners of the banking industry, Russian accounting standards are 
extremely intransparent. Leaving the proof of this intransparency for the following section, 
now we would like to concentrate on the consequences it has for the behavior of the regulator 
in Russia. Thus we formulate the first testable hypothesis: 
 
? Russian banks enjoyed regulatory forbearance as the CBR withdrew a license only after a 
bank has been violating prudential ratios for quite some time.  
Empirical evidence provides strong support of this hypothesis. In 1998 more than 25% of 
working banks did not meet the requirement of sufficient capital, 40% had not enough current 
liquidity (known as Nn3 requirement of the Russian Central Bank) and even urgent liquidity 
was insufficient in 26% of banks (requirement Nn2). As of January 1, 1999 these figures 
though decreased (8.5%/30%/18% respectively) still remained quite high (see table 4.1). The 
figures in columns represent the number of banks, which violated the corresponding 
prudential requirement imposed by the CBR or even did not provide CBR with their ratios.  
 
Table 4.1.  
Number of banks with a valid banking license, which violate CBR prudential ratios  
 
Date  Nn1  
(capital 
adequacy) 
Nn2 
(urgent 
liquidity) 
Nn3 
(current 
liquidity) 
Nn4 
(long-term 
liquidity) 
Nn5 
(general 
liquidity) 
1 Jan, 1998 427 439 659 315 528 
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1 Jan, 1999 125 259 438 341 209 
1 Jan, 2000 59 102 139 489 121 
Nn1 - corresponds to the capital adequacy ratio shows whether a bank has sufficient amount of capital and is 
measured as a ratio of capital to total risk-weighted assets of the bank. This ratio should be not smaller than 8% 
or 9% depending on the absolute amount of own capital.  
Nn2-Nn5 refer to various liquidity ratios defined as a ratio of liquid assets to bank's liabilities.  
There are few other requirements designed by the CBR, but they are usually neglected by both banks and the 
regulator.  
 
Studying the figures in the table one would notice that the greatest improvement was observed 
in meeting capital adequacy ratio (Nn1) after 1998. This is not surprising. On the one hand 
Russian banking sector was characterized by massive inflow of capital after the crisis with the 
main injections coming from the firms of the oil-exporting sector and other banks' owners 
with idle funds. CBR on its side made active effort to recapitalise the banking sector. On the 
other hand this statistics may be misleadingly optimistic as we expect that banks also 
improved their window-dressing skills.  
 
To be fair we should note that the regulator revoked licenses from the most insolvent banks. 
The figure 4.1 illustrates that the regulator was the most active prior 1999. Nevertheless the 
process of clearing up was still too slow (IMF, 2000). The result was that despite the observed 
decline, the number of banks that violated prudential ratios still remained quite substantial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  
The number of licenses withdrawn by the CBR for the violation of prudential 
requirements.  
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Overall the environment in which Russian banks operated can be characterized as forbearance 
from the regulator's side. Thus the regulator stated the rules of the game (prudential 
requirements) but did not follow them tolerating their violation. The banks had no clarity 
regarding the regulator's behavior in different contingencies. The following section is aimed 
at illustrating that indeed regulator based its decision upon banks' closure on discretion rather 
than the rule. 
 
4.1.2 Discretionary closure policy 
Prudential requirements defined by the regulator are the guidelines for banks’ behavior: a 
bank that violates these directives should be closed and the bank will stay operating in case it 
obeys them. In reality, however, violation of prudential requirements was not necessarily 
followed by timely license withdrawal and therefore banks were deprived of clear guidelines 
for their behavior. Thus, we would expect to see that only few prudential ratios really affected 
the regulator's decision to close the bank while many of the requirements were redundant. 
Let’s consider a simple model when the regulator makes decision upon bank's closure basing 
on the information about legally imposed prudential ratios. Putting this in econometric terms 
renders the following logit model: 
Prob(license withdrawal) = F(Nn1, Nn2, Nn3,…, Nnk) 
Table 4.2.  
Logit estimations.  
License withdrawal 1998 1999 2000 
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Nn1 (capital adequacy) 0.75** 1.01*** -0.59 
Nn2 (urgent liquidity) 0.43 2.43*** 1.77** 
Nn3 (current liquidity) 1.67*** -0.33 1.94** 
Nn4 (long-term liquidity) -0.01 -0.14 .. 
Nn5 (overall liquidity) 1.33*** 0.94** .. 
Moscow  -0.6** 0.39 3.55*** 
Gosbank -0.55 0.30 0.11 
Const  -3.31***  -4.06***  -7.39*** 
Number of obs. 1201 1134 1280 
Log likelihood -275 -203 -75 
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.26 0.24 
 
Dependent variable equals to 1 if license was withdrawn within 1 year after the reporting date and zero 
otherwise.  
All explanatory variables are binary.  
Nni = 1 if  i-th prudential ratio was violated by the bank.  
Moscow is a dummy for bank located in Moscow 
Gosbank  is a dummy for bank being previously involved in the Gosbank system. 
For the end of 1999 variables Nn4 and Nn5 were omitted because most of the banks failed to provide the CBR 
with these prudential ratios and it reduced the number of observations dramatically.  
Presented results of the logit estimations show that indeed not all the prudential ratios affected 
the regulator's decision to close the banks, as some of the coefficients appeared insignificant. 
Furthermore, some prudential requirements while significant on some dates became 
insignificant on another, which represents a clear evidence of the regulator's discretion. After 
the crisis the short-term liquidity coefficients became more important while capital adequacy 
ratio lost the gear by the year 2000. This is not surprising, as short-term liquidity ratio is the 
most transparent characteristic among the all as contrary to the capital item it is less 
susceptible to accounting manipulations (see Intransparency section below). Thus empirical 
evidence witnessed that the regulator chose whether to close a bank basing on the bank’s 
liquidity position rather than its solvency (Nn2 becomes significant after the crisis).  
 
4.2 Intransparency of financial reporting 
The forth prediction of the theoretical model states that accounting intransparency creates 
incentives for banks' imprudent behavior. This is consistent with the view expressed before 
that intrasparency of financial reporting is one of the factors that increases the cost of 
preventive close thus leading to regulatory forbearance. Formally the testable hypothesis 
rendered by the forth prediction of the model, can be formulated as: 
 
? Russian banks operate in environment characterized by extremely intrasparent financial 
reporting, which gives room for manipulation of figures reported. 
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In this section we present evidence of intransparency of Russian accounting standards in 
comparison with international ones. We start from presenting for comparison the aggregated 
balance sheets of banking sector in Russia and USA. Major activities of banks are reflected in 
their balance sheet. Therefore by comparing aggregate balance sheets for Russian and a 
developed Western banking system we can trace differences of behavior of a typical bank in 
the two banking systems. 
Table 4.3. 
Aggregate balance sheet of Russian and US banks, as % of total assets  
ASSETS US RUSSIA LIABILITIES US RUSSIA 
Cash reserves and balances  4 20 Current accounts, of those 23 22 
Market loans 6 4 State and  
state-owned firms 
 
 
NA 
 
6 
Securities, of those 24 18 Deposits, of those 
 
45 10 
Government securities 
 
19 7 Private 20 8 
Non-gov. securities 
 
5 11 Market borrowings 24 11 
Loans, of those  59 
 
35 Arrears to clients 0 5 
Loans to state 
Loans overdue 
 
0 
NA 
3 
8 
Other liabilities 0 11 
Fixed assets and 
miscellaneous 
 
7 15 Capital and reserves 8 40 
Other assets 
 
0 4    
Losses 
 
0 4    
TOTAL 100 100 TOTAL 100 100 
Source:  
for US: Mishkin, The economics of money, banking and financial markets, p.252 
for Russia: own calculations. 
 
Although aggregation hides some characteristics of individual banks (which will be studied in 
further analysis) besides the differences in accounting standards and financial system structure 
do not allow us to make perfectly comparable breakdown of the balance sheet, it is still 
possible to reveal some striking differing facts. 
 
First of all such items of the balance sheet as 'loans overdue' and 'arrears to clients' are the 
exclusive feature of Russian banking reporting. Note that both these figures are non-
negligible: they constitute 8% and 5% of total assets respectively. However, the notion of 
overdue loans and arrears to clients while accounted differently are still familiar to the 
Western accounting as well. The existence and size of unidentified items such are 'other 
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assets' and 'other liabilities' (accounting for 4% and 11% of total assets respectively) evidence 
even more blatant intransparencies of the accounting standards employed in Russia. More of 
it as the anecdotal evidence goes sharp increase of the other assets item often reflects on-
going process of asset stripping away from the bank (see Appendix 4). 
 
However the most strikingly diverges 'capital and reserves' item of American and Russian 
banks. Bank capitalization is one of the most important characteristics. The role of capital 
cushion is in absorbing losses and protection of bank’s creditors. Adequate capitalization is a 
prerequisite for restoring trust in bank's ability to meet its obligations in the case of a short-
term bank run. It may help to stop bank panic and prevent an illiquid bank from becoming 
insolvent. The fundamental difference between the qualitative meaning of bank capital in 
Russian and Western accounting standards stems from the difference in balance sheet 
construction. Western accounting standards define capital as a difference between the market 
value of assets and liabilities of a bank. According to the Russian accounting standards bank's 
losses are shown on the asset side of a balance sheet. Therefore due to the accounting identity 
the capital shown on the liability side of a balance sheet is automatically increased by the 
amount of losses and therefore is overestimated. Hence, the enormous figure of own capital as 
a share of total assets for Russian banks (40%) is misleading because Russian banks are 
clearly undercapitalized. Nevertheless even if we recalculate capital for Russian banks 
subtracting reported losses to make it more comparable with the western accounting 
standards, the average figure is be 29% of total assets, i.e. 3.5 times greater than for the US 
banks. The reason for this is that banks are reluctant to show their actual losses underreporting 
them. Consequently some part of bank's losses is hidden in its assets and the latter is 
overestimated resulting in artificially high figures for capital. 
 
Leaving aside for the moment balance sheet and looking at the profit and loss account 
reported by banks could provide some curious results as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  
Breakdown of the return on assets for the year 1999. 
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It has already become a conventional wisdom that official figures for profits in Russian 
companies are the most manipulated and thus unreliable ones. The figure 4.3 illustrates that 
Russian banking industry is not an exclusion in this respect. By the end of 1999 over total of 
1732 banks that submitted profit&loss accounts more than 63% had profits in the interval [-
5%;5%]. The largest number of banks have profits slightly above zero (618 banks out of 1732 
report profits greater than zero but less than 2% of their assets) which brings us to a 
conclusion that Russian banks can easily manipulate profits targeting at a certain desired 
level.  
 
Summing up, there were many banks that violated prudential ratios and still held the valid 
banking license. This means that the CBR did not use the method of preventive closure when 
regulating banks. In the framework of our theoretical model this implies that the cost of 
preventive closure was indeed prohibitively high and therefore the threat of it was not 
credible. In practice intransparent accounting increased the cost of preventive closure. Banks 
could manipulate reporting figures with the figure for capital being of the main concern. As a 
result, the regulator followed discretion rather than rule when making decision upon bank's 
closure. 
 
4.3 Regulator Having a Private Interest in Risky Project 
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This section refers to the extension of the theoretical model when we introduce the possibility 
of a regulator being privately interested in banks’ participation in risky project. There are two 
main cases when Russian regulator could be considered as having a private interest in bank’s 
risky projects. Affiliation of Russian banks with government and state-owned enterprises is 
the first one. 
4.3.1. Bank’s affiliation with the state 
Russian banking sector in the 90s was characterized by close affiliation of many banks with 
the state inherited from soviet times through personal contacts and/or Gosbank system. In 
addition even newly emerged banks tried to get connections with government at all levels to 
get access to relatively cheap money: serving non-interest bearing or low interest bearing 
state’s transaction accounts brought to a bank short-term profits.  Besides holding the state 
accounts brought the bank non-pecuniary benefits in the form of connections, recognition, and 
reputation. In return the state demanded from a bank to provide loans to strategic enterprises, 
fill the gaps of funds needed to pay salaries, etc.; this was especially true of regional banks. 
Notion of soft budget constraints, which was widely studied in literature on transition (see for 
example Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995), explains the relation between the state and an 
affiliated bank. Government affects the banks to give out loans to state-owned or strategic 
enterprises; for instance in the case when the whole city or a region is dependent on a single 
enterprise and therefore its bankruptcy would have too serious social consequences. Banks 
may be willing to provide loans to ex ante inefficient state-owned enterprises hoping for the 
bail out ex post. We should note here that while formally Russian Central Bank was an 
independent institution, in reality its dependence with the state was very high. Therefore it 
seems appropriate not to draw a line between interests of the state and the Central Bank. 
 
Let's consider the behavior of the CBR after the crisis. One of the functions of a regulator is to 
act as a Lender of last Resort for banks, in other words to provide emergency liquidity support 
to illiquid but solvent banks. Although there is some correlation between bank's insolvency 
and illiquidity, the ultimate decision of bank's closure should be based in its insolvency. 
According to the data set, the CBR as a lender of last resort provided Russian banks with total 
of more than R27 bn over the period of 1997-1999 just in the form of explicit loans. Of those 
114 banks that received the support 25 later lost their licenses. These insolvent banks received 
more than 43% of total credits. Also of these same 114 banks 18 can be identified as having 
state affiliation. These banks close to the state accounted for more than 66% of CBR's credits.  
 
One of the cases of a ‘strategic’ enterprise is a so-called too-big-to-fail firm. Our data 
evidenced that such consideration was an important factor affecting the CBR's choice of its 
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support recipients. (Mailath and Mester (1994) provided a theoretical support for too-big-to-
fail phenomena by making cost of bank’s closure dependent on its size).   
 
Table 4.4. 
Loans from the LOLR (CBR) as % of total assets.  
Banks’ size Loans from the CBR as % of total assets 
20 largest 1.3 
21-100 0.4 
101-200 0.1 
Other 0.03 
 
As shown in the table 4.4, the larger a bank was the more funds it received from the CBR. 
The difference is even more striking if we consider the figures in money terms rather than as 
shares of assets.  
 
4.3.2. Bank’s participation in GKO market 
The second practical examples of theoretical construction when the regulator is interested in a 
risky project is the example of GKOs market prior the 1998 crisis in Russia. Although the 
issuer (Ministry of finance) formally differed from the regulator (Russian Central Bank), in 
reality close affiliation between the two resulted in synchronization of their interests.  
The empirical evidence goes that the larger was the GKO portfolio of a bank the more funds it 
received: the correlation between the size of the CBR loan and amount of money invested in 
GKO was 89% as of July 1998 for the banks that received the support (excluding Sberbank 
and Vneshekonombank to avoid size effect). The importance of the involvement in the GKO 
market was even greater than our data indicates.  In addition to the explicit credit, the CBR 
bailed out banks that suffered from the GKO default by providing them implicit subsidy via 
purchase of their GKO portfolio at par value through REPO-agreements. The figure 4.3 shows 
the rapid growth of funds providing by the CBR to commercial banks through REPO-
agreements after the crisis till mid-1999. 
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Figure 4.3. 
Funds provided by the CBR to commercial banks, including claims on REPO 
agreements, R bn 
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Thus, it seems that the CBR did not perform efficiently its LOLR function. Majority of the 
funds flew to the banks that were affiliated with the state either through holding its accounts 
or via participation in the GKO market. Banks closely affiliated with the state received 
liquidity support from the CBR and banks involved in government securities market were 
bailed out after the default on domestic debt market. In the framework of our theoretical 
model it implies that regulator that was interested in risky project supported banks, which 
were involved in this project. 
 
4.4 Risk-taking by banks in Russia 
 
As the theoretical model predicts, a bank will choose risky project if the threat of closure is 
not credible (regulatory forbearance). Furthermore, even in no-forbearance environment bank 
may prefer to undertake risky project if the discount factor is high and consequently value of 
banking license low.  
 
The preceding sections presented evidence in favor of the view that Russian banks operated in 
forbearance environment. In addition we argue that value of banking license was extremely 
low not only due to very high discount factor but also because of low entry costs in banking 
sector Russia. Coupled with weak prudential supervision, this resulted in excessive risk-taking 
by Russian banks.  
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Major activities of banks are reflected in their balance sheet. The comparison of the combined 
balance sheets (table 4.3 section 4.2) of the Russian and American banks allows us to infer 
general perception of the level of banks involvement in risky operations in the two countries. 
According to conventional theory of banking supported by historical evidence, traditional 
banking can be considered as the safest type of banking activity. By saying ‘traditional 
banking’ we imply collecting personal deposits and providing loans with careful assessment 
of the creditworthiness of the borrower, in other word banks acting as intermediaries between 
those with excess funds and those with current lack of funds. Data in the table 4.3 capture the 
fact that unlike American banks their Russian counterparts are much less involved in 
traditional banking operations. i.e. in safe projects. This is reflected in small share of loans on 
the assets side of the balance sheets (59% for US vs. 35% in Russia) and relative 
unimportance of deposits as sources of finance (45% and 10% respectively). Figures for 
current accounts are roughly the same in both countries (slightly greater than 20%) and this 
reflects that Russian banks do provide payment services but not intermediation services. Now 
we turn to consideration of micro-characteristics of banking in course of Russian transition. 
 
4.4.1 Micro-economic characteristics of risk-exposure of Russian banks. 
The aggregate notion of risky strategy employed in the theoretical model has various practical 
implications. It is possible to distinguish between different types of risks the banks are 
exposed to, the most important being the risk of default or credit risk.  
 
In reality there were differences between banks on micro-level that determined exposure to a 
particular risk of a certain bank. The main micro-characteristics of a bank are its size, 
location, affiliation with the state, its involvement in traditional banking activity and, finally, 
current and previous financial position of a bank. All of these factors would influence the 
willingness of a bank to undertake risky projects.   
 
Russian banking industry was characterized by relatively low exit and entry costs in the 
Russian banking industry and limited liability of banks' owner. Consequently the owners of a 
falling banks always had an option of moving assets to a newly established bank. Therefore it 
is logical to expect that banks in a poor financial condition would be less careful with regards 
to their credit risk, especially if a bank can consider itself as a too-big-too-fail.  
 
According to classic investment theory short-term instruments ceteris paribus have a lower 
default risk than instruments with a longer term to maturity. Uncertainty regarding future 
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inflation and substantial political risk, which were salient features of Russia in the 90s, made 
the maturity characteristic of a financial instrument crucial one. Therefore short-term loans 
are considered to be relatively safe assets and therefore would result in lower credit risk 
exposure. On the contrary, long-term loans are highly risky and even suspicious investment 
opportunities.  
 
Besides, the conventional banking theory implies that combining provision of payment and 
financial intermediation services is beneficial for a bank. The idea behind is that servicing 
firms' transaction accounts provides the bank with private information about potential 
borrowers and therefore reduce the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard stemming 
from information asymmetries. Thus we would expect that holding transaction accounts 
reduce credit risk for a bank. 
 
Impact of affiliation with the state on the bank’s efficiency was discussed above in great 
details. Summing up the reasoning presented in the section 4.3.1, close affiliation with the 
state may bring a bank short-term benefits, however, it adversely affects effectiveness of the 
bank's operations in the long run and results in higher level of bad loans. There are plenty 
examples when servicing of state accounts led to a rapid growth of the bank's assets and 
enhancement of position of the bank in banking society which was followed by immediate 
decline and failure of the bank as soon as the state funds were withdrawn.  
 
To test importance of a particular micro-economic characteristic of a bank for its credit risk 
exposure the following regression were estimated for two cross-section periods and panel 
random effect regression for 1998-2000 (all variables are taken per one worker to escape pure 
size effect. L(.) – indicates lag operator):  
 
? Loans overdue = β1* L(Loans to the state) + β2*L(Loans to the state-owned enterprises) + 
β3*L(Long-tem loans to private firms) + β4*L(Short-tem loans to private firms) + β5*L(State 
Accounts) + β6*L(Firms Transaction accounts) + β7*Set of Dummies + Constant   
 
Table 4.5 summarizes testable hypothesis regarding micro-characteristics of banks’ credit risk 
exposure; it also presents the results of empirical testing of this hypothesis. 
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Table 4.5.   
The influence of banks' micro-characteristics on a bank's exposure to credit risk. 
 Expected Actual 
Loans to state-owned enterprises + + 
Short-term loans to private enterprises -  ? 
Long-term loans to private enterprises + + 
Current accounts of private enterprises  - - 
State current accounts +/- + 
Size  + + 
Moscow  - - 
Gosbank + + 
 
The regression results are consistent with the view that government affiliation lead to greater 
loan losses and so does the provision of longer-term loans. On the other hand, access to 
private information about the borrowers through servicing transaction accounts reduced 
banks' credit risk exposure (see Appendix 3, Table 3.4 for details). In addition, regional banks 
were more exposed to credit risk compared to those located in Moscow. This fact can be 
explained by greater dependence of banks on the will of municipal governments. 
 
Apart from credit risk the foreign currency and derivatives risks were studied. The regression 
analysis shows that banks involved in traditional banking (i.e. with higher share of transaction 
accounts in total liabilities) were engaged in derivatives speculations to a lesser extent. On the 
contrary the banks with smaller capital level were higher exposed to derivatives risks, 
possibly gambling for resurrection, and so were risky banks with large GKO portfolio just 
before the crisis (see Appendix 3, Table 3.6 for details).   
 
In addition banks with larger accumulated government debt were more exposed to foreign 
currency risk. Average open currency position were equal 4.3% of total assets for banks with 
large GKO holdings versus 1.5% overall. The maximum of open currency position for banks 
involved in GKO speculations was as much as 54%. More than 10% of banks that were 
significantly involved in the government debt market, had open currency position exceeding 
20% of their assets (see Appendix 3, table 3.5 for the details).  The following scheme can 
explain this finding: a bank obtained foreign currency denominated liabilities characterized by 
low interest rate and then invested further in the GKO market aiming at high profits provided 
by this market. Default on the domestic debt market coupled with severe devaluation of the 
rouble resulted in huge losses for such banks.  
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Asset stripping is the extreme case of risk-taking in a bank that foresees the inevitable failure 
in observed future. Akerlof and Romer (1993) introduced the notion of bankruptcy for profit. 
They argue that if economic value of a bank (that is discounted future profits) is less than the 
current value of its assets, there are incentives for a bank's owner to strip assets from the 
banks thus looting the bank's depositors. Akerlof and Romer developed a theoretical 
framework for this idea and provided anecdotal evidence for some failed banks that went 
bankrupt at the course of S&L crisis of the 1980s in the US. We view assets stripping as the 
extreme case of risky behavior of a bank, which foresees inevitable failure. 
 
Naturally it is very difficult to detect asset stripping based on bank’s official statement. 
However as anecdotal evidence goes it is possible to infer two proxies for stealing of assets: 
unclassified assets and loans to non-financial non-residents. The data shows that as the day of 
license withdrawal approaches the level of unclear assets increase (see Appendix 3, Table 
3.7). The pace and pattern of stealing assets most probably is individual for every bank that 
ever did it since the bank cannot predict the day of license withdrawal with certainty due to 
the regulatory discretion. As anecdotal evidence we present graphs of unclear assets over time 
for 6 banks with withdrawn licenses (see Appendix 3, Figure 3.1). While it is difficult to 
render any systematic pattern of movement, the share of unclear assets in every case has 
already reached its maximum to the day of license withdrawal.  
 
Summing up, the process of problem accumulation in a failed bank can be broadly divided 
into two stages. Initially bank's losses follow from unsuccessful investment decisions or 
inefficiency of regular banking operations (high costs and low revenues) even if a bank was 
prudent. It can be the result of inexperience of a manager or poor average quality of 
borrowers. On the other hand low profit margins and regulatory forbearance created 
incentives for banks' risky behavior and not careful asset management resulting in further 
losses. The more losses a bank has, the worse its financial position is. This brings up a 
problem of moral hazard when mangers' incentives had changed over time. Namely given 
limited liability and poor contract enforcement, bank owners have incentives to hide 
remaining assets. This is the second stage of bank's evolution characterized by massive asset 
stripping that leads to fast deterioration of the bank. Losses and bank insolvency in this case is 
the conscious choice of the bank owners. In reality timing of entering each of the stages and 
actual implication of the outlined process of assets stripping was unique for each bank.  
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5 CONCLUSION  
 
The paper studies the interaction of a bank and a regulator in transition environment. In the 
paper we argue that problems accumulated on the micro-level are more important for bank's 
bankruptcy rather than macroeconomic shocks. The paper studies reasons for banks' risky 
behavior as well as analyses optimal strategy of a regulator in transition.  
 
A game theory model of incomplete information serves as a theoretical framework, which 
captures the most important features of transition environment relevant to banking industry: 
intransparent accounting rules, high discount factor and low value of banking license. In 
addition the model introduces a feature, which was peculiar to Russia - a possibility for 
regulator to have private interest in a risky project. We believe that GKO market was one of 
the examples of such a situation. The model renders a number of important predictions 
regarding behavior of a regulator and banks in transition environment. These predictions 
found statistical support in the data available and they result in a number of policy 
implications. 
 
The model predicts that the regulator cannot credibly commit to close a bank that chooses 
risky strategy, which would be an optimal strategy. The reason for it is high cost of closing a 
risky yet viable bank, i.e. cost of so-called preventive closure. The intrasparency of financial 
reporting exacerbates the problem since the regulator cannot distinguish between safe and 
risky banks with certainty. Given that, the optimal strategy for the regulator is forbearance. 
Knowing this, banks choose risky strategy, which may bring higher return though with 
smaller probability of success. However, value of banking license is an important factor that 
determines bank's risk-exposure. Even when bank is operating in forbearance environment, it 
may choose safe project if it values its banking license highly. On the other hand a bank will 
choose risky project even if there is no forbearance in case when the value of license is low 
and the probability of success on a risky project is relatively high. The less transparent is 
financial reporting the greater a bank should value its license to prefer safe project. 
Introducing private interest of the regulator in a risky project brings distortion in the outcome 
by increasing the area where forbearance strategy is optimal for the regulator. 
 
Empirical testing confirms that Russian regulator followed forbearance policy prior the 1998 
crisis and right after it. Many banks violated prudential ratios yet holding valid banking 
licenses. Consequently when making decision upon bank's closure, the regulator followed 
discretion rather than a rule. Banks closely affiliated with the state received liquidity support 
Marina Malyutina, Svetlana Parilova, 2001  
 32
from the CBR and banks involved in GKO market were bailed out after the default on 
domestic debt market. Besides the too-big-to-fail consideration was important for the 
regulator when choosing the recipients of its support.  
 
Quite logically study of micro-economic characteristics of banks' risk exposure reveals that 
banks closely affiliated with the state were more carefree in the sense of greater credit risk 
exposure. The affiliation with the state could be in the form of holding state's transaction 
accounts and/or providing loans to state-owned enterprises or it could be connection with the 
state inherited from the soviet times' Gosbank system. Holding a large portfolio of GKOs may 
serve as another example of affiliation with the state. Banks, which were active players on the 
risky GKO market just before the crises, were also extremely exposed to currency and 
derivatives risk. In addition we found that banks in poor financial condition exposed 
themselves to credit risk more than viable banks. Indeed bank managers having no personal 
responsibility in case of bankruptcy had no incentives to save failing bank. They could shift 
assets away from the bank. Anecdotal evidence serves in favor of view that asset striping is 
the marginal case of risk-taking. Overall traditional (relatively safe) banking was much less 
widespread in Russia than in a typical developed banking system, as the comparison of 
aggregate balance sheets evidences. At the micro-level, however, banks involved in 
traditional banking were more prudent exposing themselves to credit risk as well as to 
currency and derivatives risks to a lesser extent. 
 
The results of the paper call for certain policy implications. The most important are as 
follows: 
• Improving of financial reporting is crucial for making bank regulation more efficient. 
Introducing International Accounting Standards (IAS) would make reporting more 
transparent. Calculation of bank's capital according to IAS is the top priority measure as 
capital is the most misleading figure in the balance sheet of a Russian bank. 
• Independent regulator is more efficient in regulating banking industry. In this respect the 
latter development of transformation of the Russian Central Bank into a government 
institution seems inappropriate. 
• Law on bankruptcy of banks, which would give clear criteria for license withdrawal, 
should be adopted. This law should be strictly followed, as the implementation of it is not 
less important than its adoption.  
• Introducing personal responsibility of bank managers would increase exit costs and create 
incentives for more prudent behavior. Relevant legislation regarding this should be 
adopted. 
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• Competition in the banking industry should be enhanced and the state involvement 
reduced to a minimum. This can be attained under completion of Federal Treasury system 
so that all government account will be held with the Treasury but not with commercial 
banks. Naturally the monopoly of Sberbank in retail banking should be eliminated through 
phasing out its exclusive deposit insurance coverage. 
Note that another important implication of the model is that administrative measures alone do 
not suffice to create incentives for banks being prudent. Existence of safe financial 
instruments and greater macroeconomic stability would decrease discount factor and make 
banks value their license. If this is attained the model predicts that banks would prefer safe 
behavior regardless of the strategy of the regulator. 
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APPENDIX 1.  
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. 
 
 
 Proposition 1.  
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L  if ε is a uniform, exponential or normal random variable.  
 
Proof of proposition 1:  
 
A. Uniform distribution  
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For the uniform distribution the proof is obvious. L is increasing function in σ as the 
nominator is increasing and the denominator is decreasing in σ. 
 
B. Exponential distribution  
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For the exponential distribution the proof is obvious as the denominator of the first part of the 
formula is decreasing in σ. 
 
C. Normal distribution  
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We need to prove that д L /дσ ≥0. 
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Calculation of derivatives for q  and q gives: 
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We need to prove that the nominator N1 is more or equal to zero (N1 ≥0).  
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We need to prove that N2 ≥0: 
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Let z=ϕ /σ, y=(ϕ -1)/σ. Note that z>y. 
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To prove that N2 ≥0 we need to prove that function G(x) is increasing (z>y): 
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To prove that G(x) is increasing we need to prove that дG/дx  ≥0. 
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дG/дx  ≥0   if:  
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Let us Q(x) to be equal to:  
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Note that Q( ∞− )=1 and Q( ∞+ )=0. It is easy to prove that Q(x) monotonously decreases. 
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Function Q(x) is monotonously decreasing on ∞− <x< ∞+ , with Q( ∞− )=1 and Q( ∞+ )=0. 
This means that Q(x)≥0 for any x. It follows immediately that дG/дx≥0 and G(x) is increasing, 
N2 ≥0. This means that д L /дσ ≥0. 
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APPENDIX 2. 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data set is constructed from financial statements banks provided to the Central bank of 
Russia in 1996-1999. The data include quarterly balance sheets for 1996-1999 and profit and 
losses statements for 1998-1999.  
 
The data we have is the most comprehensive for this is the results of official reporting to a 
supervisor – CBR. In a panel regression run on the data average number of observations is 7.4 
per group with absolute maximum of 8 observations per group. Therefore we think that 
unbalances in the data are not substantial. Furthermore bank is not automatically excluded 
from the sample after the license was withdrawn. Instead bank is still accountable to the CB 
even after the license was revoked and the bank is under receivership management. Therefore 
we think that data is missing rather randomly not resulting in selection bias.  
 
Given the dynamic setting of the model, dynamic panel data econometric technique would be 
the optimal one to use. The implication of it is conditional on the data. The problem is that the 
data at our disposal is stock rather than flow. It naturally results from the system of balance 
sheet reporting. Therefore unsurprisingly there is great inertia in the data that one can feel 
from the preliminary work with the data. Furthermore our data set covers the total period of 4 
years (from 1996 to 1999). In the middle of this period CB introduced changes in the 
accounting standards. This splits the data in two periods of 2 years, inside each of them data is 
fully compatible while it is not the case across the periods. Considering dynamic panel 
approach at the period of 2 years would crucially reduce the number of observations leaving 
us with something like 1.5 years. It is possible to capture any substantial dynamics of bank’s 
portfolio over such a short period. 
 
Problems arise if banks do not disclosure their true position. Banks may underestimate in 
official statements the amount of bad loans or losses, for example. However even if balance 
sheet does not reflect all the truth about a bank, there are always indicators of its financial 
position. For example, tricky deals usually increase other assets or other liabilities items of the 
balance sheet.  
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APPENDIX 3. 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS  
 
 
Table 3.1. 
Logit estimates. 1 Jan, 1998. 
 
   Number of obs = 1201 
      LR chi2(7) = 294.24 
       Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood = -275.051    Pseudo R2 = 0.3485 
 
Probability of license withdrawal Coeff. z-value 
Nn1 (capital adequacy) 0.75 2.43** 
Nn2 (urgent liquidity) 0.43 1.16 
Nn3 (current liquidity) 1.67 5.93*** 
Nn4 (mid-term liquidity) -0.01 -0.01 
Nn5 (overall liquidity) 1.33 3.80*** 
MOSCOW -0.60 -1.97** 
GOSBANK -0.55 -0.93 
Const -3.31 -13.91*** 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. 
Logit estimates. 1 Jan, 1999. 
 
Logit estimates   Number of obs = 1134 
      LR chi2(7) = 145.73 
       Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Log likelihood =  -203.297      Pseudo R2 = 0.2639 
 
Probability of license withdrawal Coeff. z-value 
Nn1 (capital adequacy) 1.01 2.961*** 
Nn2 (urgent liquidity) 2.43 6.689*** 
Nn3 (current liquidity) -0.33 -0.836 
Nn4 (mid-term liquidity) -0.14 -0.241 
Nn5 (overall liquidity) 0.94 2.487** 
MOSCOW 0.39 1.226 
GOSBANK 0.30 0.68 
Const -4.06 -14.677*** 
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Table 3.3. 
Logit estimates. 1 Jan, 2000. 
 
    Number of obs = 1280 
    LR chi2(5)  = 47.17 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -75.27  Pseudo R2 = 0.2386 
 
Probability of license withdrawal Coeff. z-value 
Nn1 (capital adequacy) -0.59 -0.461 
Nn2 (urgent liquidity) 1.77 2.236** 
Nn3 (current liquidity) 1.94 2.382** 
MOSCOW 3.55 3.336*** 
GOSBANK 0.11 0.133 
Const -7.39 -6.925*** 
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Table 3.4. 
Credit risk exposure of Russian banks 
 
 Cross-
Section 
(1999) 
Cross-
Section (2000)
Random 
effect 
(1998-2000) 
L(Loans to state) -0.02 -0.01 0.02* 
L(Loans to state-owned enterprises) 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.01* 
L(Long-term loans to private 
enterprises) 
0.19*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 
L(Short-term loans to private 
enterprises) 
0.04 0.02 0.02*** 
L(State accounts) 0.11*** 0.03 0.01 
L(Transaction accounts) -0.08** -0.19*** -0.03*** 
Dummy for 100 largest banks 0.05 0.61** 0.14** 
Dummy for the smallest banks -0.76*** -0.63*** -0.28*** 
MOSCOW -0.81*** -0.78*** -1.06*** 
GOSBANK 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.81*** 
Constant 2.43*** 3.07*** 2.59*** 
R2 25.8 21.3 20.1 
R2 adj 25.3 20.7 NA 
Number of observation 1328 1280 10288 
Number of groups NA NA 7.6 (8 max) 
All balance sheet indicators are taken as logarithms of balances' accounts per one worker. 
L(.) indicates lag operator.  
 
 
Table 3.5. 
Open Currency Position as of July 1, 1998 
 
Percentiles All operating banks Banks with large GKO portfolio 
1% -28.2 -25.9 
5% -10.2 -10.5 
10% -6.1 -4.6 
25% -1.0 -1.0 
50% 0.2 0.6 
75% 3.0 7.8 
90% 11.1 20.0 
95% 20.0 26.3 
99% 34.4 54.1 
Mean 1.5 4.3 
Open Currency Position as percentage of Total assets.  
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Table 3.6. 
Derivative risk exposure of Russian banks 
 
Number of obs = 1484   R-squared 0.2496 
F( 11,  1472) 44.5   Adj R-squared 0.2439 
Prob > F 0 
 Coeff T-statistics 
L(Excess reserves) -0.06 -2.46**
L(Capital) -0.07 -5.18***
L(Deposits) 0.05 0.78
L(Transaction accounts) -0.04 -2.00**
L(Government securities) 0.08 3.57***
MOSCOW 4.81 8.27***
GOSBANK 2.42 2.38**
Dummy for largest banks 25.62 6.61***
Dummy small -size banks -10.02 -5.52***
Dummy smallest -size banks -16.16 -11.03***
Constant 19.25 12.49***
All balance sheet variable are taken as shares of total assets. 
L(.) indicates lag operator.  
 
 
 
Table 3.7. 
Unclear assets in the balances of Russian banks as shares of total assets (%). 
 
Days before license 
Withdrawn 
100 Largest banks Smallest banks 
>600 6.9 6.8 
<600 14.7 12.6 
<360 15.5 12.6 
<100 16.8 13.5 
Unclear assets include unidentified items in banks' balance sheet.  
 
 
 
 
Malyutina, M. and Parilova S., 2000. 
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Fig. 3.1.  
Anecdotal evidence of asset stripping 
(Share of Other Assets as % of Total Assets on the vertical axe, days to license withdrawal on the horizontal axe) 
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